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Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. Metcalf
In recent years, environmental policymakers have adopted a set of instru-
ments quite diﬀerent from those usually prescribed in environmental policy
textbooks. Economists have traditionally encouraged the use of incentive-
based instruments in place of command and control regulation. The start-
ing point for a discussion of eﬃcient environmental policy has been the
Pigouvian prescription: to set taxes on pollution equal to marginal envi-
ronmental damages. In recent years, however, economists have come to
recognize that the standard Pigouvian prescription needs to be modiﬁed
in the face of other important economic and political considerations.
The reasons for this modiﬁcation of the standard Pigouvian prescription
can be found in the nature of the environmental problems to be managed.
These problems are often characterized by a transnational dimension, by
links to other economic issues, and by an interrelationship with several
types of economic externalities. All this implies that environmental policy
has to be redesigned in order to be eﬀective even in a world where the
policymakers may have multiple interrelated targets and an incomplete set
of policy instruments.
Some examples may clarify this point. If markets are not perfectly com-
petitive, and if the regulator is unable to restore perfect competitiveness—
sometimes because a single regulator does not exist, as in the case of
multinationals—then an environmental policy designed to correct the
environmental externalities produced in the imperfectly competitive indus-
try cannot be the usual “optimal” tax scheme where the tax rate is equal
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1to the social marginal damage produced by the industry. In general, the
optimal tax is lower than the social marginal damage, because the market
externality induced by imperfect competition must be taken into account.1
As another example, if the regulator is concerned about unemployment,
capital ﬂows and the location of ﬁrms, or distributional considerations
across diﬀerent sectors in the economy, then he may set a tax and mandate
the use of the resulting tax revenue in such a way as to identify the optimal
trade-oﬀ among multiple objectives (environment, employment, capital
stock, economic structure and growth, etc.).2
If the environmental problem is transnational or global, optimal policy
design is even more complicated. Trade-oﬀs may be necessary to ensure
the adoption of environmental policy tools by all or most countries in-
volved in the management of the environmental problem. Again the stan-
dard economic principle that implies the equalization of marginal abate-
ment costs and beneﬁts across countries may not be the “optimal” one.3
It is often argued that environmental policy may induce ﬁrms to inno-
vate, either by carrying out more and newer research and development
(R&D) or by adopting existing environmentally benign technology. Even
in this case, environmental policy needs to take into account external ef-
fects induced by innovation, market distortions in the R&D markets, free-
riding incentives induced by R&D spillovers, possible delays in innova-
tion, and beneﬁts and costs of R&D cooperation.4
Finally, actual policymakers often attach considerably more importance
to the distributional eﬀects of the policy measures that they adopt than
they do to issues of eﬃciency. As a consequence, environmental policy,
given the incompleteness of the policy tools that governments have at their
disposal and the presence of multiple externalities, faces the well-known
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity.5
The departure of actual environmental policy from “optimal” textbook
1. The design of environmental policy under imperfect competition is analyzed in several
recent theoretical contributions. See Carraro, Katsoulacos, and Xepapadeas (1996) and the
survey by Carraro (1999b). See also an analysis of monopolies and optimal environmental
taxation in Fullerton and Metcalf (1997).
2. The EU proposal of a 50-50 carbon/energy tax to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs)
emissions is an example of a policy instrument that balances environmental eﬀectiveness,
distributional burden across sectors, and cross-country equitable burden sharing. Another
example is provided by the green tax reforms and by their attempts to provide both an envi-
ronmental and an economic beneﬁt (double dividend). An interesting discussion of this prob-
lem is in Bovenberg (1997) and Fullerton and Metcalf (1998). A theoretical analysis of envi-
ronmental policy in the presence of multiple targets is provided by Anastasios Xepapadeas
(chap. 9 in this volume) and Michael Rauscher (chap. 6 in this volume).
3. The design of policy instruments in a world where economic issues are often global, but
decisions are taken by (many) sovereign states, is the core of the analysis carried out in
Carraro and Siniscalco (forthcoming).
4. These problems are more fully analyzed in Carraro (1999a). New results are provided
by Katsoulacos, Ulph, and Ulph (chap. 10 in this volume).
5. See chapter 2, by Bovenberg and Goulder, and chapter 6, by Rauscher, in this volume.
2 Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. Metcalfrecommendations may also be induced by political constraints. For ex-
ample, the failure to use environmental taxation in Europe can be ex-
plained by objections to new taxes in countries where the tax burden is
already quite high. This has to do with the acceptability of policy measures
on which a consensus needs to be found. This is also why voluntary envi-
ronmental agreements seem to have become a widely adopted policy tool
in Europe. Even though this tool may not produce the optimal manage-
ment of a given environmental problem, it may be the only way to achieve
some satisfactory results on emission control in some industries or coun-
tries.6 In other cases, environmental policy is not optimal because it is
simpler or less costly in terms of administrative costs to adopt a policy
that is built on existing policies or that is implemented through an existing
set of procedures or administrative structures.7
These remarks suggest some common themes. First, environmental pol-
icy has to manage new environmental problems in a world in which there
is an insuﬃcient number of appropriate policy tools because of inertia,
lack of consensus, or an excessive number of policy targets. Hence, policy
analysis inevitably deals with second-best worlds and yields second-best
policy outcomes.
In addition, most environmental problems are closely linked to indus-
trial, trade, and ﬁnancial problems. Hence, any analysis of these problems
should not be carried out by specialists in environmental economics only,
but by economists who can integrate environmental economics with public
ﬁnance, industrial economics, and trade theory, among other ﬁelds.
These conclusions led us to design a book in which chapters are written
by leading economists who are able to integrate environmental analysis
with the analysis of other intertwined economic issues. Hence, we invited
experts from public ﬁnance, industrial organization, and trade theory in
order to increase “leakages” and “transplants” across ﬁelds. The chapters
also analyze economic and policy problems in which distributional issues
and multiple market failures inevitably lead to second-best policy analyses.
Two other novel features of this book deserve some comment. First,
most chapters adopt a microeconomic, behavioral approach to environ-
mental problems. This is not to say that a macroeconomic analysis of envi-
ronmental issues, as is presented in most textbooks, is inappropriate. We
believe, however, that greater insight into the mechanisms through which
environmental policy works to correct externalities can be obtained by
looking at the behavioral responses of economic agents to environmental
policy initiatives. It is thus possible to single out the economic incentives
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6. For example, the Danish and Italian governments have recently implemented a policy
scheme to achieve the Kyoto targets in which a modest environmental tax is linked to wide-
spread adoption of industry-speciﬁc voluntary agreements.
7. See chapter 2 by Fullerton, Hong, and Metcalf, and chapter 3 by Smulders and Volle-
bergh in this volume.provided by environmental policy, their eﬀects on a ﬁrm’s strategy, and
their distribution across sectors.
A second important feature is the focus on empirical microeconomic
analysis. Most chapters not only provide important theoretical advances,
but also attempt to validate the theoretical analysis through careful empir-
ical research, which is often carried out on newly constructed data sets.8
Hence, this book can be distinguished from other books because of its
ability to integrate theoretical and empirical research, environmental eco-
nomics and environmental policy, behavioral and distributional concerns,
and environmental issues in a wide set of economic analytical tools.
The book is the outcome of a fruitful partnership between the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei (FEEM). In order to prepare this book, a conference was held in
Milan, Italy, in June 1999, where papers were presented and discussed.
Discussants were asked to prepare written discussions, which are also pub-
lished in this book. These discussions outline directions for future research
and can be quite useful to those who might extend and generalize the
results presented in the chapters of this book.
The papers published in this volume fall into four broad groups. The
ﬁrst group is concerned with issues that arise in the design and implemen-
tation of tax or other market-based instruments. The second group of pa-
pers addresses compliance cost issues in environmental policy. The third
group of papers addresses environmental policy design when trade and
development issues are considered. Finally, the last group of papers takes
up the issues of incentives, information, and R&D as they aﬀect optimal
policy design. As the categories presented suggest, the papers in this vol-
ume span a wide range of topics in the area of environmental policy, in
keeping with the overall design we had in mind when planning the volume.
Taxes and Other Economic Instruments
As noted, environmental policy is rarely applied in a ﬁrst-best world
in which pollution is the only externality to be corrected and in which
policymakers have all the information necessary to implement standard
Pigouvian tax schemes. Moreover, distributional concerns and administra-
tive costs may also aﬀect the decision to adopt a given environmental pol-
icy instrument. These issues are discussed in depth in the ﬁrst part of this
volume.
Chapter 1, by Don Fullerton, Inkee Hong, and Gilbert E. Metcalf, en-
titled“ATaxonOutputofthePollutingIndustryIsNotaTaxonPollution:
TheImportanceofHittingtheTarget,”considerstheeﬃciencyimplications
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8. Three good examples are chapter 5 by Becker and Henderson, chapter 4 by Levinson,
and chapter 8 by Siniscalco et al. in this volume.of imprecisely targeted instruments. While the standard undergraduate en-
vironmental economics textbook prescribes the use of Pigouvian taxes on
emissions, real-world environmental taxes generally tax inputs or outputs
that are imperfectly correlated with pollution. Given the practical diﬃ-
culties in monitoring pollution, it is often administratively less costly to
tax inputs or outputs associated with pollution. These goods may already
be taxed and are traded in markets, making the imposition and collection
of a tax relatively straightforward. The authors calculate optimal tax rates
on goods associated with pollution, as well as tax rates on pollution itself
under diﬀerent assumptions about the availability and use of various tax
instruments. Among other ﬁndings, the authors conﬁrm the result that the
optimal tax rate on emissions in the presence of preexisting taxes on other
goods or factors is less than the social marginal damages of pollution, the
level prescribed by Pigou (1932) in his classic analysis of pollution taxes.
The authors also consider the relative gains from changes in either pollu-
tion or output taxes and ﬁnd that the welfare gain from increasing output
taxes is roughly half of the welfare gain from a comparable increase in a
tax on pollution itself.
Distributional concerns and their impact on the optimal environmen-
tal policy are at the heart of chapter 2, by A. Lans Bovenberg and Law-
rence H. Goulder, entitled “Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of
CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?” One of the signiﬁcant ob-
stacles to any major tax reform or new tax initiative is the existence of
windfall gains and losses that accrue to various industry sectors. This con-
cern has manifested itself in the construction of a market for tradable per-
mits for SO2 emissions in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in the
United States. During the debate leading up to this new law, an important
question was whether ﬁrms should be given the permits (grandfathered)
or should be sold the permits. Bovenberg and Goulder draw attention to
the possibility of an intermediate position in which some of the permits
are given and the remainder sold. Given the large potential of any CO2
policy to generate industry rents (windfall proﬁts), the authors ﬁnd that
only a small fraction of emissions permits need be grandfathered to pre-
serve proﬁts and equity values for a ﬁrm. The computable general equi-
librium (CGE) simulations that the authors run suggest that the most
aﬀected industries (coal and oil and gas) need have no more than 15 per-
cent of their permits grandfathered to preserve proﬁts and equity values.
In the context of an emissions tax, only a small fraction of the emissions
need be exempted from taxation. The authors also point out the large
diﬀerence between preserving a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and preserving its tax pay-
ments. Since a large fraction of the carbon tax burden is shifted forward
to consumers, compensating ﬁrms for the taxes they owe (the statutory
burden) will overcompensate them (relative to the economic burden of the
tax). Bovenberg and Goulder carry out a variety of simulations in a CGE
Introduction 5model to consider a full range of possible policy plans with their corre-
sponding incidence eﬀects across industries. The key ﬁnding—that poten-
tial rents are large relative to proﬁts in the absence of regulation and so
grandfathering a small fraction of permits suﬃces to compensate ﬁrms for
their losses—holds generally in their model.
A frequent obstacle to the introduction of eﬃcient environmental poli-
cies is the presence of relevant administrative costs. Chapter 3, by Sjak
Smulders and Herman Vollebergh, is entitled “Green Taxes and Adminis-
trative Costs: The Case of Carbon Taxation.” Smulders and Vollebergh
explore the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and administrative costs in the
design of environmental tax instruments with a particular focus on carbon
taxes in Europe. As emphasized by Fullerton, Hong, and Metcalf, emis-
sions taxes are more eﬃcient than output or input taxes, which only indi-
rectly tax emissions. Smulders and Vollebergh focus more sharply in this
chapter on the speciﬁc administrative costs that arise in the construction
and operation of a pollution tax system. In addition, they allow for a con-
tinuum of policy choices between the use of emissions taxes and product
or input taxes.
Smulders and Vollebergh note that where emissions are closely linked to
inputs (or outputs), abatement possibilities are few, and if administrative
costs of emissions taxes are high, then emissions taxes should not be imple-
mented. Those conditions precisely apply to carbon emissions and the
current tax treatment of carbon in several European countries. The carbon
content of fuels is relatively ﬁxed for each fuel type and carbon scrubbing
is very costly with current technologies. Moreover, carbon taxes can build
on an extensive system of energy taxation and so do not require that a
large new collection system be developed. This piggybacking can lead to
considerable administrative cost savings. The authors then go on to exam-
ine current carbon taxation in various European countries to investigate
the extent to which the taxes have been optimally implemented. They ﬁnd
that there is considerable scope for broadening the tax base for the carbon
tax at little additional administrative cost.
Compliance Costs
Environmental policy often gives rise to substantial compliance costs.
This is an argument raised by companies and industrial lobbies to oppose
environmental regulation and policy, who often threaten to relocate their
industrial plants in countries where compliance costs are lower. To assess
the validity of this argument, it is crucial to deﬁne a correct methodology
to quantify compliance costs. Only then is it possible to analyze the impact
that compliance costs have on the investment decisions of domestic and
foreign ﬁrms. This is done by the second group of papers in this volume.
6 Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. MetcalfIn chapter 4, entitled “An Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environ-
mental Compliance Costs,” Arik Levinson constructs an index of state-
level environmental regulatory stringency from 1977 to 1994 across the 50
states of the United States. The index has a number of advantages over
existing indexes of environmental regulation. Previous measures were of-
ten subjective and simple cross-sectional measures that made analysis of
trends across time and states impossible to carry out. Moreover, Levinson
notes that the indexes ignore diﬀerences in industrial composition across
states. Ignoring industrial composition means that states with a heavy con-
centration of pollution-intensive industry will show up as a highly regu-
lated state (as measured by costs of compliance), regardless of the state’s
regulatory structure. Levinson’s measure explicitly controls for industrial
composition. After constructing the measure, Levinson applies it to an
analysis of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States. He ﬁnds
that the index performs better than other measures of regulatory strin-
gency in measuring the impact of environmental policy on FDI.
Chapter 5, by Randy Becker and J. Vernon Henderson, is entitled “Costs
of Air Quality Regulation” and investigates the role of air quality regula-
tions in the United States in capital investment as well as the cost structure
of ﬁrms. For the past 20 years, each county in the United States has been
designated as in or out of attainment with the National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone (O3). Firms in nonattain-
ment areas are subject to stricter scrutiny and regulation than are ﬁrms
in attainment areas, and the contrast between investment behavior in non-
attainment versus attainment areas can serve to identify the impact of
environmental policy on ﬁrm investment. The identiﬁcation process is
confounded, however, by the fact that ﬁrms can self-select into or out of
nonattainment areas, and Becker and Henderson pay careful attention to
the endogeneity of ﬁrm behavior. Focusing on the industrial organic chem-
ical and miscellaneous plastic parts industries—major emitters of volatile
organic compounds and nitrogen oxides—the authors ﬁnd that the stricter
regulation in nonattainment areas leads to greater amounts of up-front
investment in those areas but lower overall size in mature ﬁrms. The large
up-front ﬁxed costs associated with the permitting process for construction
of new plants makes it eﬃcient for ﬁrms to increase their initial plant
investment. Moreover, as regulations tighten over time, these plants are
grandfathered under the old rules and so avoid increased production costs.
Becker and Henderson then quantify the regulatory costs by estimating
cost functions and comparing cost diﬀerences between attainment and
nonattainment areas. The cost diﬀerences are substantial. Not surpris-
ingly, these cost diﬀerences are considerably larger than the costs of pollu-
tion abatement estimates from data sets that directly measure pollution
abatement investment and costs. Among other things, the latter data sets
Introduction 7only measure costs of activities directly and substantially related to pollu-
tion abatement and so ignore many of the costs that ﬁrms bear in response
to regulation.
International Trade and Development
Environmental policy often has an international dimension. This is be-
cause environmental problems are often international or even global. But
the international dimension of environmental policy is also related to its
distributional and behavioral impacts. Indeed, policy decisions taken in
one country may aﬀect economic variables in other countries through their
eﬀects on trade, investment, energy prices, and other economic variables.
This may modify both the growth and the distribution of world income
(this point should be obvious if, for example, one thinks of the eﬀects of
past oil shocks). Some of these aspects are taken into account by the pa-
pers in the third part of this volume. For instance, chapter 6 extends the
analysis of the double dividend question to the case in which international
factor movements are explicitly considered in the model,9 whereas chapter
7 focuses on the interdependence between environmental policy and in-
come distribution at the world level.
Chapter 6, by Michael Rauscher, is entitled “International Factor
Movements, Environmental Policy, and Double Dividends.” Rauscher in-
vestigates how the design of environmental policies aﬀects unemployment
and welfare in a model with unemployment due to sticky wages. While a
ﬁxed-wage model ignores the complexities that arise when unemployment
is due to a wage-bargaining-type model, it allows Rauscher to focus on
the interactions between unemployment and environmental tax reforms.
As in Bovenberg and Goulder’s chapter, environmental policy can lead
to scarcity rents that accrue to those who employ capital as a factor of
production. A tightening of environmental policy raises the scarcity rents,
which in turn makes capital more desirable (since the rents are associated
with the use of capital). As the demand for capital rises, labor is more
productive and ﬁrms respond by hiring more workers, thus lowering unem-
ployment. Rauscher considers a variety of environmental tax reforms and
measures the impact of this rents eﬀect on unemployment. He ﬁnds that
this rents-unemployment connection persists in general equilibrium and
that it is possible that tighter environmental policy could in fact attract
mobile capital from outside the country and thus lower unemployment. A
corollary ﬁnding is that a shift from command and control regulation that
creates scarcity rents to a tax regime that allows the government to appro-
9. The double dividend literature explores the implications of nonenvironmental beneﬁts
in addition to environmental beneﬁts when taxes on pollution are implemented. For a recent
survey on this issue, see Bovenberg (1999).
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mains an empirical question to be answered in future research.
Chapter 7, by Raghbendra Jha and John Whalley, is entitled “The En-
vironmental Regime in Developing Countries.” Again the chapter is con-
cerned with distributional issues, but at the international level. Jha and
Whalley make a number of points relating to diﬀerences in environmen-
tal problems and solutions between developing and developed countries.
First, they note that environmental problems in developing countries are
more typically problems of degradation rather than of pollution. Soil ero-
sion, congestion, and common property resources, for example, create
externalities that may dwarf the externalities arising from traditional pol-
lutants. Jha and Whalley argue that to contrast environmental policies in
developed and developing countries without taking into account the very
diﬀerent environmental issues is to paint a very misleading picture of the
problems and possible solutions. They next point out that measures of the
social costs arising from environmental problems are highly misleading if
the measures focus on traditional pollutants that are the focus of policy in
developed countries. Third, the relation among economic growth, policy
reform, and environmental quality may diﬀer considerably between devel-
oped and developing countries, suggesting that grafting policy responses
from developed countries onto developing countries without considering
the diﬀerences between the two regions may be misguided. The authors
conclude by arguing that an index of the severity of environmental prob-
lems across countries that measures the welfare gain from moving to full
internalization of the externalities would work best to transcend the large
diﬀerences in institutional and economic structure, as well as environmen-
tal problems across developed and developing countries.
Information, Incentives, and Environmental R&D
The last group of papers in this volume focuses more deeply on the
behavioral eﬀects of environmental policy. In order to assess the eﬀective-
ness of diﬀerent sets of policy instruments, it is important to analyze how
these instruments modify ﬁrms’ strategic incentives to promote their prod-
ucts, to innovate, to invest in R&D, to locate their plants in diﬀerent coun-
tries or regions. The chapters contained in the fourth part of the volume
extend previous results by introducing uncertainty and irreversibilities, by
allowing for endogenous cooperative environmental R&D among ﬁrms in
the same industry, and by accounting for the possibility that ﬁrms adopt
appropriate incentive schemes to increase the environmental performance
of their own management.
In chapter 8, entitled “Environmental Information and Company Be-
havior,” Domenico Siniscalco, Stefania Borghini, Marcella Fantini, and
Federica Ranghieri present some preliminary results from a fascinating
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voluntary initiatives range from company environmental reports to envi-
ronmental audit and management schemes, such as the recent Interna-
tional Standards Organization (ISO) 14000 standards. Critics of these poli-
cies argue that they are simply public relations schemes to make the
companies look environmentally benign. It may be, however, that these
types of policies can have real eﬀects, given the complex structure of large
corporations. Agency theory can help explain why these policies might
have real eﬀects. Shareholders care about the value of the company, which
can be adversely aﬀected by liabilities arising from harmful environmental
activities in which the ﬁrm may engage. In addition to the liability risk,
ﬁrms can lose valuable goodwill and reputation, which in turn can dimin-
ish the value of the ﬁrm. While shareholders may have a stake in their
company engaging in environmentally clean activities, managers may not
share this stake. Voluntary information-based policies can play a role in
aligning the two groups’ interests. Siniscalco and his coauthors have a
unique data set that may allow formal tests of some of the theoretical
underpinnings of agency theory associated with these voluntary environ-
mental policies.
Since 1992, FEEM has been collecting data from ﬁrms that produce
corporate environmental reports. In 1998, approximately 150 ﬁrms had
produced these reports. The authors ﬁrst provide some background infor-
mation on the ﬁrms and the types of reports they prepare and then turn
to a data analysis of a number of large ﬁrms based in 16 countries in the
petrochemical, oil and gas, and electric power-generation industries. It is
important that the researchers have gathered additional information on
the companies’ environmental compensation and award schemes for em-
ployees as well as economic data for the ﬁrms. Their preliminary data
analysis suggests that the quality of information provided in these corpo-
rate environmental reports has important explanatory power for corporate
environmental management. While tentative, their results are compatible
with some of the emerging agency theories on voluntary information-based
environmental policies. Their empirical analysis suggests that ﬁrms that
implement some form of environmental reporting perform better from
both an economic and an environmental point of view. Moreover, ﬁrms
that implement incentive schemes to induce managers to do careful envi-
ronmental reporting achieve better results than ﬁrms that do not. While
these results are quite preliminary, the chapter provides valuable infor-
mation about the range of information-based activities taken at a large
number of important international ﬁrms and suggests fruitful research op-
portunities as this data set grows over time.
Chapter 9, by Anastasios Xepapadeas, is entitled “Environmental Pol-
icy and Firm Behavior: Abatement Investment and Location Decisions
under Uncertainty and Irreversibility.” Xepapadeas allows for uncertainty
10 Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. Metcalfover output prices, environmental policy, and technological parameters as
ﬁrms consider the optimal level of investment in pollution abatement capi-
tal as well as the location of new plants. Investment and relocation costs
are in many cases irreversible and optimal decision making takes into ac-
count the value of options that are killed by making irreversible invest-
ments. Xepapadeas constructs a framework in which policymakers can
construct optimal emissions taxes and pollution abatement subsidies un-
der a variety of models of uncertainty.
Yannis Katsoulacos, Alistair Ulph, and David Ulph take up the topic
of environmental research joint ventures (RJVs) in chapter 10. Their chap-
ter, entitled “The Eﬀects of Environmental Policy on the Performance of
Environmental Research Joint Ventures,” investigates the optimal amount
of investment in R&D related to pollution abatement technologies when
ﬁrms can form voluntary research joint ventures. From the point of view
of ﬁrms, RJVs help ﬁrms avoid costly duplication of R&D eﬀort. This
is beneﬁcial from society’s point of view, although there is the counter-
vailing loss from the possibly slower development of new technologies
that could signiﬁcantly reduce pollution due to the lack of competition.
In the context of this model, policymakers have two instruments at their
disposal. They can levy environmental taxes that will encourage R&D ac-
tivity. They can also prohibit the formation of RJVs if they feel that the
costs resulting from a slowdown in pollution abatement innovations from
RJVs outweigh the beneﬁts of avoiding duplication of investment costs.
The authors show that the magnitude of environmental damages that can
be averted through innovations resulting from R&D activity is a critical
parameter for understanding whether government should allow or pro-
hibit RJVs.
Conclusion
There are a few lessons that can be learned from the set of papers pub-
lished in this book. First, in a world in which multiple externalities and
market imperfections interact, and in which implementation costs are rele-
vant—mainly because of information asymmetries—environmental pol-
icy needs to be careful designed and is inevitably more complex than the
ﬁrst-best policies usually studied in textbooks. In particular, a policy mix
formed by environmental and nonenvironmental policy instruments is of-
ten adopted as part of the price paid for political or administrative viabil-
ity. Second, innovation in policy instrument design is also important for
managing new and complex environmental problems. Third, the social
costs of environmental policy cannot be neglected. There are various strat-
egies through which a regulator can reduce the costs paid by ﬁrms and
consumers. For example, when designing the environmental policy mix,
the regulator can use the possible revenue of environmental taxation to
Introduction 11provide incentives to spur economic growth. But the regulator can also
adopt low-cost economic instruments, such as information-based policies
and incentive schemes, that improve ﬁrms’ environmental performance
while minimizing impacts on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Alternatively, the regulator
can adopt policies to encourage environmental technological cooperation,
or policies to discourage ﬁrm relocation or capital ﬂight.
The chapters presented in this book suggest that further eﬀorts should
be made to analyze the costs and beneﬁts of policy mixes speciﬁcally de-
signed to manage new and complex environmental problems. Empirical
analyses can be a great help in this matter. Another lesson that can be
derived from the chapters of this book is that new empirical information
can be very helpful for assessing the performance and cost of diﬀerent
policy mixes. However, empirical analysis is still at a preliminary stage,
particularly in Europe, mainly because reliable and broad data sets on
environmental issues are still relatively rare. It is our hope that the research
presented in this book will play a part in spurring further empirical
work—both in Europe and North America—that will extend our under-
standing of environmental policy design in a second-best world.
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